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Abstract 
Simulation of the infrastructure performance using numerical models may significantly assist 
in developing strategies for improving its resilience to harmful effects of climate change. The 
paper presents a model for simulating the performance of interdependent infrastructure 
systems based on an extended network flow approach, i.e., infrastructure systems are 
considered as a network of nodes connected by directed edges. The model has been 
specifically developed to simulate the infrastructure performance at a community scale and 
has higher node resolution compared to typical models of infrastructure systems at the 
national level. The model is time dependent so that the infrastructure performance can be 
assessed at discrete points over a period of time. Parameters describing the performance of 
infrastructure assets (e.g., production and flow capacities, demands) can be treated as random 
variables or probabilities can be assigned to failures of the assets. The application of the 
model is illustrated by the probabilistic assessment of the performance of two interdependent 
infrastructure systems – electrical power and water, damaged by flooding. 
Keywords: Infrastructure systems, interdependency, community-scale, network flow model, 
failure, probabilistic analysis. 
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Introduction 
Infrastructure of many countries is currently subject to ever increasing loads due to 
population growth and suffers from deterioration associated with ageing that makes it more 
vulnerable. It also faces new challenges due to climate change that may lead to an increase in 
the frequency and intensity of weather-related hazards, e.g., floods, storms, heatwaves. Such 
hazards can harm energy and water supply, transport, communication routes and other 
infrastructure systems (e.g., Pitt 2008). 
Hence, there is a clear need for efficient strategies to improve the infrastructure 
resilience, both at national and local levels, that will ensure its continuous and reliable 
performance in the future. Simulation of the infrastructure performance, including the effects 
of its failures, may significantly assist in developing such strategies. Numerical models that 
can be used for such purpose need to meet certain requirements. First, the models should be 
able to take into account interdependencies between different infrastructure systems, i.e., 
when failure in one system may cause severe disruptions and failures in other systems (e.g., 
Rinaldi et al. 2001, Kröger 2008). For example, many infrastructure systems (e.g., water, gas, 
telecommunications) depend on an electricity system to function (e.g., Adachi and 
Ellingwood 2008, Winkler et al. 2011). Second, since conditions of infrastructure and 
demands on it may change rapidly during and after a hazard event it is also important to be 
able to simulate the infrastructure performance over a period of time, e.g., from the moment 
the infrastructure has been damaged by the hazard and until its full restoration. To carry out 
such analysis time-dependent (or dynamic) models are required (e.g., Trucco et al. 2012). In 
addition, there are major uncertainties associated with the prediction of hazard occurrence, its 
effects and damage induced to infrastructure by these effects (e.g., Barker and Haimes 2009). 
Under such circumstances the use of probabilistic models capable of explicitly accounting for 
such uncertainties is highly desirable (e.g., Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osorio 2013). 
Different approaches have been employed so far to examine various performance and 
vulnerability characteristics of interdependent infrastructure systems. Their extensive review 
has recently been presented by Quyang (2014), who broadly divided them into the following 
types: (1) empirical, (2) agent-based, (3) system dynamics-based, (4) economic theory-based, 
(5) network-based, and (6) other approaches. Other reviews and classifications of 
infrastructure models are also available (e.g., Pederson et al. 2006, Eusgeld et al. 2008).  
The present paper concentrates on modelling the performance of interdependent 
infrastructures at a local (or community) scale. This means that smaller infrastructure systems 
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compared to those at a national level need to be considered but higher model resolution (i.e., 
ability to take into account relatively small infrastructure components like emergency 
generators) is required. Network-based approaches seem to be very suitable for this purpose. 
These approaches are further subdivided into topology-based, which analyse the vulnerability 
of infrastructure systems based on their topologies, and flow-based, which consider the flow 
of commodities delivered by infrastructures (Quyang 2014). Since another modelling 
objective of this study is to quantitatively assess the amount of commodities/services, which 
can be supplied by infrastructures to costumers during and after a hazard event, a network 
flow approach is selected (e.g., Ahuja et al. 1993).  
The paper starts with a brief overview of network flow models which have been 
proposed for modelling the performance of various infrastructure systems, including their 
interdependencies. After that a model developed in this study for simulation of the 
performance of interdependent infrastructure systems at a local scale is presented. The model 
is based on the concept of a multifunctional node (Svendsen and Wolthusen 2007), when a 
node can simultaneously perform production, consumption, transhipment and storage 
functions associated with different commodities and be a part of different infrastructure 
systems at the same time. This also provides capabilities to simulate local infrastructure 
features such as storage facilities and emergency generators. The infrastructure performance 
can be modelled over a period of time (e.g., from the moment it has been damaged by a 
hazard until its full restoration) at discrete time steps. In order to simulate the operation of 
damaged infrastructure a variable representing unmet demand (or shortage) is introduced 
along with the corresponding cost (or penalty) that is similar to a slack variable in the model 
of Lee et al. (2007). To take into account uncertainties associated with the infrastructure 
performance, including possible damage of the infrastructure assets by a hazard, parameters 
of the model (e.g., production and flow capacities, demands) can be treated as random 
variables or probabilities can be assigned to failures of nodes and edges. The application of 
the model is illustrated by an example that shows the probabilistic assessment of the 
performance of interdependent infrastructure systems (electrical power and water) damaged 
by a weather related hazard (flood). 
Network flow models of infrastructure systems 
In network flow models, an infrastructure system is considered as a network of nodes (or 
vertices) connected by directed edges (or arcs). In the traditional network flow approach the 
nodes usually represent physical infrastructure assets (e.g., electricity substations, water 
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treatment works, water pumping stations, road intersections, hospitals, office and residential 
buildings) associated with supply, transhipment and demand of resources (e.g., water, 
wastewater, electricity), which are referred to as commodities. The edges model the 
flow/movement of commodities between the nodes and represent, e.g., power transmission 
and distribution lines, water and wastewater pipelines, roads. Mathematically, this means that 
infrastructure is presented as a directional graph (or digraph) G = (V, E), where V is the set of 
nodes and E is the set of directed edges. In order to find the flows on the edges the problem is 
then formulated as a linear programming problem that aims to optimise the infrastructure 
performance by minimising its total operational cost, C (Ahuja et al. 1993) 
 minimise  


Ee
e
ef fcC ,         (1) 
 subject to Viff
iii             (2) 
 and  Veff
max
ee     0       (3) 
where fe and fe
max
 are the flow rate of commodity on edge e and the maximum flow capacity 
of this edge, respectively, c
f,e
 the cost associated with this flow, f 
i←
 and f 
i→
 are the in-flow 
and out-flow rates at node i (i.e., the sums of the flow rates over all edges transferring the 
commodity into and out of the node), respectively, and κi the demand/supply rate of the 
commodity at node i (κi is positive if it represents demand and negative otherwise). Eq. (1) 
represents the total cost of commodity flow within the network and in the context of linear 
programming is called the objective function. The flows, fe, are variables to be determined 
from the solution, while c
f,e
 and κi are known coefficients (or parameters). Eq. (2) is the 
balance equation for the commodity at node i, while Eq. (3) sets bounds on the variables; in 
the context of linear programming these equations are referred to as constraints.   
It should be noted that models based on the traditional network flow approach only 
ensure continuity of the commodity flow at nodes, while physical laws governing the flow 
within an infrastructure system may not be fully satisfied. However, such models are still 
employed to analyse individual infrastructure systems, e.g., for optimisation/planning of 
power and water systems (Padiyar and Shanbhaq 1988, Manca et al. 2010). A major 
advantage of the network flow approach in the analysis of multiple interdependent 
infrastructure systems is that the same mathematical formulation can be used to describe the 
flow of commodities in different systems (e.g., power, water, gas, transport). 
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The traditional network flow approach has several limitations that preclude its direct 
use for analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems, in particular when they are 
damaged. For example, only a balanced network, in which the total supply of a commodity 
equals its total demand, can be analysed; there are no tools to model storage of commodities 
as well as interdependencies between infrastructure systems; and changes in the flow of 
commodities over time cannot be considered. A number of extensions of the traditional 
network flow approach have been proposed to overcome these limitations. To account for 
possible damage to infrastructure, when the total supply of a commodity is less than its total 
demand, Lee et al. (2007) introduced slack variables, which represented shortfall in meeting 
demands at nodes, and the corresponding weighting factors, which represented the costs 
associated with the shortfall. In addition, variables were also introduced to describe 
interdependence between individual infrastructure systems, which were modelled by separate 
networks so that the model was called the interdependent layer network (ILN) model. The 
node types included in the model were the same as in the traditional network flow approach, 
i.e., supply, demand and transhipment; edges were able to model both single and 
multicommodity flows. The model was time-invariant and in order to consider any change 
over time a new set of input data needed to be prepared and a new analysis to be run. The 
ILN model was mathematically formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming problem. 
The model implementation was demonstrated by guiding the restoration of services of three 
damaged interdependent infrastructure systems: electrical power, telecommunications and 
subway. Arboleda et al. (2009) then used the model to determine cost-effective strategies for 
restoring interdependent infrastructure systems (electrical power, water and transportation of 
medical supplies), which support a health care facility, after a natural hazard event. A similar 
model was later proposed by Shen (2013). To allow for the integration of the restoration 
planning and scheduling decisions the ILN model was later extended to a time-variant model; 
for individual infrastructure systems that was done by Nurre et al. (2012) and for 
interdependent infrastructure systems – by Cavdaroglu et al. (2013). This was achieved by 
using a multiperiod formulation of a network flow problem. In this formulation a considered 
time horizon is divided into a number of time periods and the network to be solved is a 
composition of multiple networks, each of them representing the network under consideration 
at one of these time periods. 
A different network flow model for the analysis of interdependent infrastructures was 
presented by Quelhas et al. (2007). The model was developed to simulate the movement of 
bulk energy flows (electricity, natural gas and coal) in the US integrated energy system. The 
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model comprises two types of nodes: source (or supply) nodes and transhipment nodes, 
which also represent demand. The production of natural gas and coal, storage facilities, 
energy conversion facilities (power plants) were represented by the edges outgoing from 
added dummy source nodes so that all restrictions on the production, storage and energy 
conversion were expressed through parameters of these edges. In particular, the so-called 
efficiency parameter, which related the flows at the beginning and at the end of an edge, was 
introduced. In order to account for the evolution of the system over time the multiperiod 
formulation, as in Cavdaroglu et al. (2013), was used. The model was later extended by Gil 
and McCalley (2011) to simulate large-scale disruptions in the system; in particular, to ensure 
a feasible solution when due to disruptions demand exceeded available supply a dummy 
supply node was added to the network. This node was connected to all demand nodes via 
edges having unlimited capacities. In order to prevent flows on these edges as long as supply 
met demand the costs associated with these flows were set higher compared to other edges.   
Svendsen and Wolthusen (2007) proposed a conceptual network flow model with 
multifunctional nodes, where the same node could act both as a consumer and a producer and 
also had storage facilities. The latter required explicit consideration of time since the amount 
of a stored commodity could change over time. This was achieved by considering the 
network states at discrete points in time. However, the model was not presented in enough 
detail and examples provided in the paper dealt mainly with topological analysis of 
infrastructure networks.  
Extended network flow model 
Model outline 
The network flow model, which is described in the following, is an extension of the 
traditional network flow approach. The model is developed to simulate the performance of 
interdependent infrastructure systems at a local (community) scale under normal and extreme 
conditions (i.e., when infrastructure is damaged by weather related hazards). Like in the 
traditional approach infrastructure is presented as a digraph G = (V, E). The nodes, V, 
represent infrastructure assets associated with production (including supply), consumption 
(including demand), transhipment and storage of commodities; e.g., electricity substations, 
water and wastewater treatment plants, water towers and pumping stations, which are mainly 
associated with production and transhipment of commodities, as well hospitals, shops, office 
and residential buildings, which are consumers of commodities. The edges, E, are similar to 
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those in the traditional approach and each edge models the flow of a single commodity; e.g., 
power transmission and distribution lines, water and wastewater pipelines, etc. 
The following extensions compared to the traditional approach have been made. First, 
when infrastructure is damaged a network representing the infrastructure may become 
unbalanced, i.e., the total demand of commodity, k, may exceed its available supply. To be 
able to model this, a variable, λk, representing unmet demand/shortage (i.e., the difference 
between actual demand and available amount of commodity) is introduced, along with the 
corresponding cost (or penalty), c
λ
k. Second, resilience of infrastructure systems can be 
increased through the use of local storage and production (e.g., emergency generators) 
facilities. To take these into account variables representing storage, sk, and production, πk 
(with the corresponding costs, c
s
k and c
π
k, respectively) are added to the model. This means 
that a commodity may be available from supply (i.e., from sources outside of the considered 
local infrastructure), local production and storage. However, to produce commodity k another 
commodity (or commodities), n, may need to be consumed. To distinguish between 
traditional supply and internal production, the variable πk is expressed as the sum of a 
variable πk,k representing traditional supply (i.e., supply from sources outside the boundaries 
of the local infrastructure, when commodities needed for the production of k are ignored) and 
πn,k representing the internal production (i.e., consumption of commodity n to produce k is 
taken into account). In a similar way, a variable κk representing consumption of commodity k 
is the sum of a variable κk,k, which denotes traditional demand, and κk,n denoting consumption 
of k for production of commodity n. Third, the introduction of πn,k and κk,n also enables to 
take into account interdependencies between different infrastructure systems as these 
variables are used to model the situations when the production of a commodity in one 
infrastructure system requires the consumption of a different commodity delivered by another 
system. Some of the definitions introduced above are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 Fourth, parameters of the infrastructure network under consideration (e.g., production 
capacities, consumer demands, flow capacities, amounts of stored commodities) may change 
with time. In order to take this into account the model is formulated as time-variant. This is 
done in the following way. The solution process starts at time t0, which in principle may be 
any time depending on the purpose of the analysis. For example, the analysis can start just 
before a hazard strikes and the infrastructure network becomes damaged. After that, solutions 
are sought at discrete time steps Δt until, e.g., the infrastructure is restored. Since it is 
assumed that all variables and constants (except of the amount of stored commodities) remain 
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unchanged within a time step, Δt may be different at different time steps. This time-variant 
formulation is similar to the one proposed by Svendsen & Wolthusen (2007). 
 
 
Figure 1. Basic elements of the extended network flow model. 
 
Finally, there are significant uncertainties associated with the prediction of 
infrastructure damage caused by weather related hazards. Moreover, demands for 
commodities may also be uncertain. This can be taken into account by (i) assigning 
probabilities of failure to infrastructure assets represented by nodes and edges, and/or (ii) 
treating the demands, the production and/or flow capacities as random variables.  When only 
the first approach is employed several (e.g., m) components (i.e., nodes and/or edges) of the 
infrastructure network under consideration may be in two states – of failure with probability 
Pf,j and operational with probability (1-Pf,j), where Pf,j denotes the probability of failure of the 
j-th component (j = 1, …,m). It is worth to note that m may be significantly less than the total 
number of the network components since only a few of them may be vulnerable to a 
particular weather-related hazard. The whole infrastructure network then can be in 2
m
 states, 
each of which depends on the states of the components. The probabilities of occurrence of 
each of these infrastructure states can be easily calculated, e.g., the probability of the state 
when all the components are operational is          
 
   . When the number of the states is 
not too large (around 10
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the analyses can be aggregated in a probabilistic format (e.g., the probability distributions of 
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commodity supplies available to customers at different points in time can be derived). The 
number of the states that need to be analysed can be reduced by neglecting the states with 
very low probabilities of occurrence. When a number of the infrastructure network 
parameters are represented by random variables a probabilistic analysis of the network can be 
carried out using Monte Carlo simulation. Since very efficient computational methods are 
available for solving linear programming problems the time required for the analysis of a 
medium-sized network (i.e., ranging between tens to hundreds of nodes that is typical for 
interdependent infrastructure systems at a local scale) should not be excessively long.  
Node balance equations 
In this section the relationships between various variables and constants representing the four 
functions of a node (see Figure 1) are described. 
The balance equations at node i for commodity k are 
 0 ik
i
k
i
k
i
k
i
k sf        (4)
0 ik
i
k f        (5) 
where fk
i←
 and fk
i→
 are the in-flow and out-flow rates, respectively, πk
i
 the production rate, k
i
 
the transhipment rate, and sk
i
 the rate of transferring the commodity to/out of storage. If no 
cost is associated with the transhipment of the commodity and there is no risk of damage of 
the transhipment function of node i then these two balance equations can be replaced by a 
single one 
0  ik
i
k
i
k
i
k
i
k sff                   (6) 
It is worth to note that different commodities can be processed at a node. Hence, the balance 
equations should be satisfied at the node for each of these commodities. In-flow and out-flow 
rates, fk
i←
 and fk
i→
, are the sums of the flow rates over all edges transferring commodity k into 
and out of the node i, respectively.   
The production rate of commodity k at node i is expressed as 



kn
i
kn
i
kk
i
k ,,         (7) 
where πk,k
i
 is the supply rate, when the need in another commodity to produce commodity k is 
not taken into account (usually, at nodes that represent sources of supply of commodity k 
outside the boundaries of the local infrastructure network), πn,k
i
 the rate of production of 
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commodity k that involves consumption of another commodity n. It is assumed that there is a 
linear relationship between the amounts of produced and consumed commodities so that 
i
kn
i
kn
i
kn ,,,          (8) 
where αn,k
i
 is the coefficient relating the production rate of commodity k to the corresponding 
consumption rate, κn,k
i
, of commodity n. Thus, Eq. (8) becomes    



kn
i
kn
i
kn
i
kk
i
k ,,,          (9) 
The assumption about a linear proportionality between produced and consumed commodities 
(Eq. (8)) is essential in order to formulate the model as a linear programming problem. This 
assumption is often correct only when additional conditions are met. For example, the ratio 
between the electrical power produced by a generator and the rate of the corresponding fuel 
consumption remains constant as long as the generator operates at a constant power, e.g., at 
its rated capacity. Similarly, the ratio between the flow of pumped water and the power 
consumed by the pump is constant when the total head and the pump speed do not change. If 
there is a clear nonlinearity in the relationship between the amounts of produced and 
consumed commodities in order to maintain a linear programming formulation this 
relationship can be approximated by a piecewise linear function. 
The consumption rate of commodity k at node i is given by 



kn
i
nk
i
kk
i
k ,,                  (10) 
where κk,k
i
 is the rate of consumption of commodity k to satisfy demand of consumers, κk,n
i
 
the rate of consumption of commodity k to produce another commodity n. In order to take 
into account the possibility that not all demand is met when infrastructure is damaged κk,k
i
 is 
presented as 
i
k
maxi
k
i
kk  
,
,                 (11) 
where κk
i,max
 is the actual demand rate, i.e., the maximum/required rate of consumption of 
commodity k at node i at a given time and λk
i
 the rate of unmet demand (or shortage). Eq. (10) 
can then be written as 



kn
i
nk
i
k
maxi
k
i
k ,
,                 (12) 
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The introduction of storage as one of the node functions makes the model formulation 
time-variant. The amount of commodity k stored at node i at time t is denoted as ωk
i
(t) 
    tsttt ik
i
k
i
k                 (13) 
where sk
i
 is the rate of change in the amount of stored commodity and Δt the time step.  
Taking into account Eqs. (9) and (12), Eq. (4) can be written as 
0,
,
,,,  

 i
k
i
k
kn
i
nk
i
k
maxi
k
kn
i
kn
i
kn
i
kk
i
k sf            (14) 
Eq. (5) remains unchanged, while Eq. (6) can be updated in a similar way to Eq. (4). 
Formulation of linear programming problem 
As in the traditional network flow approach (see Eq. (1)), this extended model is formulated 
as a linear programming problem that minimises the cost of running of an infrastructure 
network. This cost, C, per unit of time within the time interval (t-Δt, t) can expressed as  
        (
2
1
1
,,,, 
 







K
k Vi
i
k
i
k
i
k
Vi
i
k
i
k
Vi
i
k
i
k
Vi
i
k
i
k
Ee
e
k
ef
k tttccccfcC 
        (15) 
where ck
f,e
, ck
π,i
, ck
τ,i
, ck
λ,i
 and ck
ω,i
 are the costs associated with flow, production, 
transhipment, shortage and storage of commodity k per unit of time, respectively, and K the 
total number of commodities. Note that the cost of storage (the last sum in Eq. (15)) is based 
on the average amount of stored commodity within the time interval (t-Δt, t). If to substitute 
Eqs. (9) and (13) into Eq. (15) the total cost becomes 
 
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1
1 ,
,,,
,
,,,
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
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k
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i
k
Ee
e
k
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k
ttc
tsccccfc
C



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    (16) 
where fk
e
, πk,k
i
, κn,k
i
, k
i
, λk
i
 and sk
i
 are the variables to be determined from the optimisation 
problem solution, while the rest of the parameters appearing in this equation are constants. 
This means, in particular, that the last sum in Eq. (16) is a constant and should be excluded 
from the objective function. In order to obtain the total cost, including the full cost of storage, 
this term can be added after solving the optimisation problem. 
The optimization problem can then be formulated as 
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subject to the following general constraints: 
KkVisf maxik
i
k
i
k
kn
i
nk
i
k
kn
i
kn
i
kn
i
kk
i
k  

   and      ,,,,,           (18) 
KkVif ik
i
k 
   and       0                 (19) 
KkVimaxik
kn
i
kn
i
kn
i
kk 

  and      ,,,,                 (20) 
and variable bounds: 
max,0 ek
e
k ff     
KkEe   and 
                                (21) 
KkVii kk    and      0 ,                             (22) 
knKnKkVii kn   and  , ,    0 ,                     (23) 
KkViik    and      0                   (24) 
KkVi τ maxik
i
k    and     0
,                 (25) 
Kk Vi
t
s
t
i
k
i
ki
k
i
k 




  and       
max, 
               (26) 
where fk
e,max
 is maximum flow capacity on edge e, πk
i,max
 the maximum production capacity of 
commodity k at node i, k
i,max
 the maximum transhipment capacity for commodity k at node i 
and ωk
i,max
 the maximum storage capacity for commodity k at node i. 
 It is important to note that minimising the total cost separately at each time step does 
not give an optimal solution for the network performance over the whole time period under 
consideration. For example, when an infrastructure network is undamaged it is obvious that 
the optimal amount of a stored commodity is zero – if everything works properly there is no 
need for stored commodities because their storage incurs additional costs. However, when the 
network is damaged by a hazard the availability of commodities from storage may reduce the 
total cost (since there are additional high costs penalising for unmet demand). This problem 
can be resolved either by artificially setting negative costs for storage and assuming that the 
amount of a stored commodity equals the maximum capacity of the corresponding storage 
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(under normal conditions this will prevent the use of stored commodities and adding more 
commodities to storage because of negative storage costs) or minimizing the total cost over 
all considered time steps, i.e., using the multiperiod formulation as in (Quelhas et al. 2007, 
Cavdaroglu et al. 2013). The second approach seems preferable. However, in order to use this 
approach the time required for restoring the infrastructure to its original undamaged condition 
needs to be known that may be difficult to predict. It should also be noted that the first 
approach does not allow to optimise the amount of stored commodities during a single 
analysis but this shortcoming can be overcome by running various scenarios with different 
storage capacities.  
Probabilistic analysis of local infrastructure network 
The application of the proposed model is illustrated by a hypothetical example, which 
examines the performance of two interdependent infrastructure systems (electrical power and 
water, see Figure 2) at a local level during a flood event. The power system includes four 
electricity substations - a primary substation and three secondary substations. The water 
system includes a water treatment plant, a water tower and a water pumping station, which 
consume electricity to pump water. Their maximum capacities are given in Table 1. It is 
assumed that 1 kWh is required to pump 7.5 m
3
 of water. There are three nodes representing 
consumers: a hospital, a care home and surrounding residential area and a residential area; 
their daily demands for electricity and water are given in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Local infrastructure network. Edges: solid lines - water pipelines, dashed lines – 
distribution power lines. 
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Node Asset Maximum capacity 
Electrical power system 
2 Primary substation 20 MWh/day 
4,7 Secondary substation 5 MWh/day 
5 Secondary substation 10 MWh/day 
Water system 
1 Water treatment plant 1000 m
3
/day 
3 Water tower 550 m
3
 
6 Water pumping station 200 m
3
/day 
   
Table 1. Description of infrastructure systems. 
 
 
Node Consumer Daily demands 
  Electricity (MWh/day) Water (m
3
/day) 
8 Hospital 1.3 35 
9 Care home & residential area 3.1 75 
10 Residential area 6.0 165 
 
Table 2. Electricity and water demands by consumers. 
 
Two options are considered: (i) without emergency generators; (ii) with emergency 
generators at the nodes 3, 6 and 8. Each generator has a power of 12 kW, a storage tank for 
100 litres of fuel, and can produce 3 kWh per litre of consumed fuel (i.e., diesel). 
It should be noted that in this example the costs of flow, storage, production and 
shortage do not represent actual costs and are assigned to ensure that the commodities are 
distributed between the consumers as intended. For example, in order to prevent the use of 
stored commodities (i.e., water and fuel), until there is no other way to meet demands, the 
costs of their storage are set negative. It is also assumed that among the consumers the 
hospital is the most important one and hence has the highest priority in receiving required 
commodities, followed by the care home and then the residential area. The costs of shortages 
of water and electricity for these consumers are set accordingly, i.e., the highest costs for the 
hospital, lower costs for the care home and the lowest ones for the residential area. 
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The performance of the infrastructure network during a 1-in-100-year flood, which 
usually represents the design event, is analysed. The three secondary electricity substations 
(nodes 4, 5 and 7) are located on a floodplain and may need to be shutdown depending on 
inundation depths. Flood modelling is not considered explicitly in this paper. It is assumed 
that a probabilistic flood map has been obtained for the plain using a hydraulic model and 
taking into account relevant sources of uncertainty. As a result, distribution functions, f(d), of 
the inundation depth, d, at the locations of the electricity substations are available. Flood 
defences have been planned for the substations; taking these defences into consideration 
fragility curves, showing the probability of a substation flooding for a given inundation 
depth, Pf|d(d), have been constructed. The probability of failure (i.e., flooding and subsequent 
shutdown), Pf, of an electricity substation can then be estimated as 
   dddfdPP dff 


0
|                 (27) 
For the three substations the following probabilities of failure in the case of the 100-
year flood have been obtained: node 4 - 0.4, node 5 - 0.6 and node 7 - 0.2. Since the 
substations can only be in two states (operational and shutdown), the whole network can be in 
8 (=2
3
) states, whose probabilities are easily calculated analytically. The infrastructure 
network will function in a partially damaged condition until the secondary substations will 
return to operation, which may take several days. The aim of the example is to analyse what 
happens with the supply of electricity and water to the consumers when it takes up to six days 
to restore these substations. The analysis is carried out using a daily time step (i.e., Δt = 1 
day). Each of the eight network states is analysed separately and results of the analyses are 
then aggregated using the probabilities of occurrence of the states in order to obtain the 
probability distributions of the amounts of electricity and water that can be supplied to the 
consumers. These amounts are expressed as a percentage of the corresponding demands.  
Figures 3 and 4 present the results for the case without emergency generators. Figure 
3 shows the probability distributions of the electricity supply to the consumers. For the 
hospital (node 8) and the care home with surrounding it residential area (node 9) only two 
events are possible – full (100%) supply with probability 0.61 and no (0%) supply with 
probability 0.39; for the residential area there are three possible events – 100% supply with 
probability 0.27, 0% supply with probability 0.60 and 93% supply (i.e., 93% of the daily 
electricity demand are supplied) with probability 0.13. As can be seen, disruptions in 
electricity supply may start on the first day and the results do not change over the considered 
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6 days. Disruptions in water supply (Figure 4) may occur on the first day only in the 
residential area (node 10) due to failure to supply electricity to the water pumping station 
(node 6). The water stored in the water tower ensures that this commodity is supplied in full 
during the first two days to the hospital (node 8) and the care home with surrounding it 
residential area (node 9). Disruptions in water supply to these consumers may start on the 
third day and the situation worsens on the sixth day. 
 
                          
Figure 3. Probabilities of electricity supply to the consumers (without emergency generators). 
 
The corresponding results for the case, when the emergency generators are used, are 
not shown in graphical form.  The main difference is that in this case there are no disruptions 
in water supply to all three consumers within the considered time period. Moreover, it has 
further been checked that with the relatively small amount of stored fuel the emergency 
generators at the water tower and the water pumping station are capable to ensure continuous 
supply of water to the consumers for up to 11 days when the electricity substations are not 
functioning. However, the emergency generator at the hospital has a relatively small effect on 
the situation with electricity supply – from the second day the results are exactly the same as 
in Figure 3. To have a more noticeable effect on the electricity supply to the hospital the 
amount of stored fuel for this generator needs to be increased. 
It is worth to note that the model can be used to examine the performance of much 
more complicated infrastructure networks, with higher temporal resolution (e.g., hourly) and 
also enables to treat, if necessary, parameters of the network (e.g., demands, production 
and/or flow capacities) as continuous random variables. 
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Figure 4. Probabilities of water supply to the consumers (without emergency generators). 
Conclusions 
A network flow model for simulation of the performance of interdependent infrastructures at 
a local scale has been presented in the paper. The model allows to conceive of a number of 
different infrastructure systems as a single network which ensures that their 
interdependencies are taken into account. A novel aspect of the model is a multifunctional 
node, which is capable to simulate production, consumption, transhipment and storage 
processes. The model also enables to carry out time-variant analysis and analyse networks 
with unbalanced supply and demand (the latter is essential to simulate the performance of 
damaged infrastructures). An example demonstrating the model application has been 
provided. Functioning of two small interdependent infrastructure systems – electrical power 
and water, during a flood event has been considered. It has been shown how uncertainties 
associated with damage/failure of the infrastructure assets can be taken into account. The 
example has also demonstrated how the model may be used to redistribute commodities 
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between various consumers in accordance to the consumers’ relative importance when the 
demand for these commodities exceeds their available supply. 
References 
Adachi, T., and Ellingwood, B.R., 2008. Serviceability of earthquake-damaged water 
systems: Effects of electrical power availability and power backup systems on system 
vulnerability. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 93(1), 78-88. 
Ahuja, R.K., Magnanti, T.L., and Orlin, J.B., 1993. Network Flows: Theory, Algorithms and 
Applications. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Arboleda, C., Abraham, D., Richard, J.-P., and Lubitz, R., 2009. Vulnerability assessment of 
health care facilities during disaster events. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 15(3), 149-
161. 
Barker, K., and Haimes, Y.Y., 2009. Assessing uncertainty in extreme events: Applications to 
risk-based decision making in interdependent infrastructure sectors. Reliability Engineering 
and System Safety, 94(4), 819-829. 
Cavdaroglu, B., Hammel, E., Mitchell, J.E., Sharkey, T.C., and Wallace, W.A., 2013. 
Integrating restoration and scheduling decisions for disrupted interdepended infrastructure 
systems. Annals of Operations Research, 203(1), 279-294. 
Eusgeld I., Henzi D., and Kroger W., 2008. Comparative evaluation of modeling and 
simulation techniques for interdependent critical infrastructures. Scientific report, ETH 
Zurich, p.50. 
Gil E.M., and McCalley, J.D., 2011. A U.S. Energy System Model for disruption analysis: 
evaluating the effects of 2005 hurricanes. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 26(3), 1040-
1049. 
Hernandez-Fajardo, I., and Dueñas-Osorio, L., 2013. Probabilistic study of cascading failures 
in complex interdependent lifeline systems. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 111, 
260-272. 
Kröger, W., 2008. Critical infrastructures at risk: A need for a new conceptual approach and 
extended analytical tools. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 93(12), 1781-1787. 
19 
 
Lee, E.E., Mitchell, J.E., and Wallace, W.A., 2007. Restoration of services in interdependent 
infrastructure systems: a network flows approach. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews, 37(6), 1303–1317. 
Manca, A., Sechi, G.M., Zuddas, P., 2010. Water supply network optimisation using equal 
flow algorithms. Water Resource Management, 24(13), 3665–3678. 
Nurre, S.G., Cavdaroglu, B., Mitchell, J.E., Sharkey, T.C., and Wallace, W.A., 2012. 
Restoring infrastructure systems: An integrated network design and scheduling (INDS) 
problem. European Journal of Operational Research, 223(3), 794-806. 
Quyang, M., 2014. Review on modeling and simulation of interdependent critical 
infrastructure systems. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 121, 43-60.  
Padiyar, K.R., and Shanbhaq, R.S., 1988. Comparison of methods for transmission system 
expansion using network flow and DC load flow models. International Journal of Electrical 
Power & Energy Systems, 10(1), 17-24. 
Pederson P., Dudenhoeffer D., Hartley S. and Permann M., 2006. Critical infrastructure 
interdependency modeling: a survey of U.S. and international research. Idaho National 
Laboratory, Idaho Falls. 
Pitt, M., 2008. The Pitt Review: Learning Lessons from the 2007 Floods. 
Quelhas A., Gil E., McCalley J.D., and Ryan S.M., 2007. A multi-period generalized network 
flow model of the US integrated energy system: Part I—Model description. IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, 22(2), 829–836. 
Rinaldi, S.M., Peerenboom, J.P., and Kelly, T.K., 2001. Identifying, understanding and 
analysing critical infrastructure interdependencies. IEEE Control Systems Magazine, 21(6), 
11-25. 
Shen, S., 2013. Optimizing designs and operations of a single network or multiple 
interdependent infrastructures under stochastic arc disruption. Computers & Operations 
Research, 40(11), 2677-2688. 
Svendsen, N., and Wolthusen, S., 2007. Connectivity models of interdependency in mixed-
type critical infrastructure networks. Information Security Technical Report, 12(1), 44–55. 
20 
 
Trucco, P., Cagno, E., and De Ambroggi, M., 2012. Dynamic functional modelling of 
vulnerability and interoperability of Critical Infrastructures. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 105, 51-63. 
Winkler, J., Dueñas-Osorio, L., Stein, R., and Subramanian, D., 2011. Interface network 
models for complex urban infrastructure systems. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 17(4), 
138-150. 
 
